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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TED CLARK, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,l

v.

DEE C. HANSEN, State Engineer,

)

Case No. 17093

)
)
Defendant-Respondent. )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was initiated as an attempt to review the Decision of the State Engineer approving Application No. 50723,
filed by L. Derral Christensen.

However, prior to the filing

of this action, the State Engineer withdrew that Decision by
granting a Rehearing on Application No. 50723.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent State Engineer moved to dismiss Appellants' Complaint on the grounds that the District Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, since there was no final decision of the
State Engineer for the Court to review, and also that the applicant was an indispensable party to the action.

The District

Court concluded that it was without jurisdiction and dismissed
the action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent State Engineer seeks to affirm the Order of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fourth Judicial District Court dismissing this action.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent State Engineer does not believe that there is
any substantial disagreement between the parties concerning the
basic facts of this case, but there are certain additional factsomitted by Appellants from their Statement--which are relevant to
the Court's consideration of this matter.

Consequently, we be-

lieve the following summary more completely reflects the relevant
facts in this case.
Application No. 50723 was filed by L. Derral Christensen to
appropriate groundwater in Juab County, Utah (R. 6-8).

Notice

of this Application was given by publication in the local newspaper, and the subject Application was protested by the Deseret
Irrigation Company, Melville Irrigation Company, Abraham Irrigation Company, Delta Canal Company, Jack M. Nelson, Steel Mcintyre,
and Gordon and Barbara Nielson (R. 6-7).

But this Application

was not protested by any of the Appellants in this action, nor
did they participate in the administrative hearing subsequently
held by the State Engineer to consider the protests which had
been filed (R. 6-7) .
The State Engineer issued a Memorandum Decision on January
18, 1980, approving Application No. 50723 (R. 6-7).

On February

13, 1980, the State Engineer received a "Petition for Reconsideration" from the Deseret Irrigation Company, Melville Irriga-
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tion Company, Abraham Irrigation Company and Delta Canal Company--all of whom had protested the approval of this Application--to reconsider the issues associated with Application
No. 50723.

The State Engineer granted a Rehearing on February

20, 1980 (R. 20).
(R.

The Rehearing was held on March 12, 1980

22), which was the same day Appellants filed their Complaint

(R. 1).

The State Engineer has not yet issued any further deci-

sion regarding Application No. 50723.
Appellants' Complaint sought a reversal of the State Engineer's January 18, 1980, Decision approving Application No.
50723 (R. 5).

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the action

on the grounds that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the granting of the Rehearing by the State Engineer withdrew his prior Decision, and thus he had not yet made a final
decision within the meaning of Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (R. 15-23).

Respondent's Motion to Dis-

miss also asserted that the applicant, L. Derral Christensen,
was an indispensable party to any action to review his Application (R. 16).
The District Court dismissed this action for lack of jurisdiction following consideration of memoranda and oral argument
by the parties (R. 61-62).

Appellants' appeal challenges that

decision.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION TO GRANT REHEARING ON APPLICATION NO. 50723
WAS WITHIN THE POWER OF THE STATE ENGINEER AND WAS FULLY
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
A.

The Need of the State Engineer for Rehearings as Part
of the Administrative Process
The Legislature has delegated to the State Engineer the

primary responsibility for the administration and allocation of
the water resources of the State (§73-2-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended).

All applications to appropriate water, as well as change

applications, must be filed with and initially ruled upon by the
State Engineer (§§73-3-2 and -3).

This is also the situation

with extension of time requests on approved but unperfected applications and changes (§73-3-12).

Thus, the State Engineer

makes literally hundreds of decisions each year on water right
matters and, while all of his final decisions are subject to
appeal pursuant to the provisions of §73-3-14, only a few are
in fact appealed.

There is a significant need to allow the ad-

ministrative process to run its full course before a court reviews a matter.

This is aptly illustrated in this case, where

the State Engineer is dealing with complex hydrologic and geologic questions associated with the availability of groundwater
and the relationship between a proposed appropriation and already established and existing water rights and other claims.
This is an involved, detailed, and technical matter.
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Certainly

there is every reason to allow the State Engineer to make a
complete evaluation of a matter before a Court reviews it-including holding a Rehearing if one is requested and the State
Engineer believes, under all the facts and circumstances, that
it should be granted.
Courts are reluctant to interfere with action of
an administrative agency prior to its completion and
which in this sense is not final. This reluctance
has found expression in the manner in which courts
construe constitutional provisions to limit the
availability of judicial review of such action, in
rules relating to timing judicial relief developed
by the courts apart from any constitutional necessity,
such as the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, in a general requirement of "ripeness for
review," and final action by the administrative agency
as a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review.
Such requirements involve a determination of the particular stage at which a person may secure review of
administrative action and the immediacy of the impact
of such action and impingement upon an asserted right,
as well as the focusing of issues for effective judicial determination, the opportunity for subsequent
challenge to the determination, and the freedom of
the agency to bring its action to fruition without
judicial intervention. The requirements are often
stated in terms of the particular remedy in which
judicial relief is sought. Thus, it is said that it
is the general rule that administrative action which
is not final cannot be attacked in an injunction proceeding, the reason being that absent a final order
or decision, power has not been fully and finally
exercised and there can usually be no irreparable
harm; and that where administrative intention is expressed but has not yet come to fruition or where that
intention is unknown, the controversy is not yet ripe
for equitable intervention.
(2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, §583, pp. 410, 411).
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B.

The State Engineer has Authority to Grant Rehearings
The underpinning for Appellants' case is that the State

Engineer is completely without authority to rehear any aspect
of one of his decisions.

Under Appellants' theory, the State

Engineer could not ever correct minor mistakes, nor make any
adjustments to any of his decisions--however necessary to or
desirable in the interests of the parties.
should not be the case.

Certainly this

Section 73-2-6, Utah Code Annotated

1953, as amended, specifies that:
The state engineer shall keep his off ice at the
state capitol, but all proceedings and hearings
requiring the attendance of water users and witnesses shall be held within the county where the
land is located.
Further, with respect to the authority of the State Engineer,
Section 73-2-1 provides, in part, that:
He shall have power to make and publish such rules
and regulations as may be necessary from time to
time fully to carry out the duties of his office,
and particularly to secure the equitable and fair
apportionment and distribution of the water according to the respective rights of appropriators . .

. .

Pursuant to his statutory authority and the provisions of
the Utah Administrative Rule-making Act (§63-46-1 et seq.,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended}, the State Engineer has
adopted formal Rules governing his hearings and rehearings.
Since the Legislature has delegated to the State Engineer the
responsibility to decide whether an application to appropriate
water should be approved or rejected based upon specified
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statutory criteria (§73-3-8), the State Engineer should
have the authority to rehear and reconsider his decisions
where appropriate.

It must be remembered that decisions of

the State Engineer are not completely final for sixty days
following their issuance, as that is the time during which such
decisions may be appealed (§73-3-14).

This is not a situation

where the State Engineer is attempting to leave uncertainty in
the decision-making process.

The State Engineer realizes the

need for certainty and finality in this area.

The twenty-day

time period (or some reasonable extension thereof) within which
to petition for a rehearing is not an effort on the part of the
State Engineer to leave his decisions open-ended.

Appellants'

naked assertion that the State Engineer violated his own Rules
(by granting a Rehearing when the request was not filed within
the twenty-day period provided for in those Rules) ignores the
fact that these Rules also provide that for good cause the twentyday period may be extended--as it was in this instance.

The fact

that Appellants were not aware of such extension is not surprising, since they were not involved in the administrative proceedings before the State Engineer.

Consequently, Appellants' re-

liance upon West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Comm.,
537 P.2d 1027 (Ut. 1975), is clearly unjustified.

Further, a

court will not override an agency's interpretation of its own
rules unless the interpretation is clearly erroneous (McKnight
v. State Land Bd., 14 Ut.2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963)).
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Of course,

once the sixty-day appeal period provided for in Section
73-3-14 passes, the State Engineer's decision becomes final
and he cannot consider new or additional evidence dealing with
the substantive criteria governing his decision on an application.

And he does not suggest otherwise.

But there are times

when fairness and justice dictate that a rehearing should be
granted.

Such a procedure is fully consistent with the author-

ity granted the State Engineer in this specialized and technical
area, and is also in the best interests of the public.

The

authority to rehear a matter has been recognized as being inherent within the power to initially decide the matter.

Davis,

in his Treatise on Administrative Law (1958), at §18.09, states:
Every tribunal, judicial or administrative, has some
power to correct its own errors or otherwise appropriately modify its judgment, decree, or order.
Also, 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, at §525, states:
. . it is held that an administrative agency may
reopen its determination to permit the introduction
of further evidence, or reconsider, modify, or change
its determination by reason of newly discovered evidence, or to meet changed conditions, except as restricted by statute or ordinance.
This rule has been recognized and approved in a number of States:
The question then arises whether the Cornmission has
jurisdiction to further reconsider its decisions. As
to this, the answer must be in the affirmative. The
power to reconsider is inherent in the power to decI"de.
Albertson v. Federal Communications Commission, 87 U.S.
App.D.C. 39, 182 F.2d 397. The Commission had the jurisdiction to entertain the second motion and the power
to grant or deny it.
(Wammack v. Industrial Comm. of
Arizona, 320 P.2d 920, 954 (Ariz. 1958); Emphasis Added}.
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In Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 71 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1950),
the New Jersey Court ruled that:
In analogy to the authority of courts of general
jurisdiction at common law, administrative tribunals possess the inherent power of reconsideration
of their judicial acts, except as qualified by statute. This function arises by necessary implication
to serve the statutory policy.
(71 A.2d at 627).
Also, see Anchor Casualty Co. v. Bongards Co-op Cream. Ass'n.,
91 N.W.2d 122 (Minn. 1958); Spanish International Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Co., 385 F.2d 615 (D.C.Cir. 1967);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. New Process P. Co., 104 S.W.2d 1106
(Tex. 1937); Ruvoldt v. Noland, 305 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1973); and
Equitable Trust Co. v. Hamilton, 123 N.E. 380 (1919).
In evaluating the power to grant a rehearing, courts have
also looked with favor where, as here, the request for rehearing must be filed prior to the time that the period for seeking
judicial review has expired.

The Delaware Supreme Court, in

Henry v. Dept. of Labor, 293 A.2d 578 (Del. 1972), stated:
No provision in Title 19, Delaware Code, chapter 33
provides the Board with the power to grant a rehearing.
In Delaware, however, a public body exercising
judicial functions inherently has the power, even
without statutory authority, to reopen and reconsider
a decision until it loses jurisdiction.
In Lyons v.
Delaware Liquor Commission, 5 Del.Gen.Sess. 304, 58
A.2d 889 (1948), where a decision by the Delaware Liquor Commission refusing to grant a liquor license
was affirmed, the Commission granted a motion for rehearing and vacated a previous order before the period for seeking judicial review had expired.
(293
A.2d at 581).
See also Bd. of Education v. Iowa State Bd. of Public Instr.,
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157 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1968).

This Court has recoanized the need
J

for a reasonable interpretation of statutory grants of authority
to administrative agencies to carry out agency responsibilities
(McGarry v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 592, 232 Pac. 1090 (1925)).

c.

Established Administrative Practice is Presumed Valid
The State Engineer adopted Rules of Procedure for Hear-

ings {which includes procedures governing rehearings discussed
above) in 1974, pursuant to the provisions of §73-2-1 and the
Utah Administrative Rule-making Act {§63-46-1 et seq.).

Where

the Rules promulgated by the State Engineer are in response to
express statutory authority and there is no showing that such
Rules exceed his authority, his action is presumed to be valid:
As an administrative agency statutorily created and
endowed with specific enumerated powers and duties
delegated pursuant to the police power of the state,
the Board's exercise of those powers within the
scope of its authority is entitled to a presumption
of validity and constitutionality . . . . Here,
specific authority is delegated to make rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the regulation
of the practice of pharmacy and the lawful performance of the duties of the Board, including the regulation of the sale of drugs and medicines. C.R.S.
1963, 48-1-2{1) (d) and {e). The presumption of validity of the rules regularly promulgated is not to
be lightly cast aside by mere allegations in a complaint of unconstitutionality, and the burden is upon
the party challenging the constitutionality to establish by a clear and convincing showing beyond a reasonable doubt the asserted invalidity. This requires
more than a mere assertion of a claim.
(Moore v.
District Court, 518 P.2d 948, 951 {1974)).
Also, the Utah Legislature has met on a number of occasions
since the State Engineer's Rules of Procedure for Hearings were
adopted, and no effort has been made to change, modify or adjust
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the State Engineer's authority in this area.

Legislative

acquiescence in an administrative practice may be inferred
from silence for a number of years (United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915); United States v. Philbrick, 120
U.S. 52 (1887); and Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied 389 U.S. 975 (1967)).
D.

Appellants' Inconsistent Position
There is a fundamental and basic inconsistency in

Appellants' position in this matter.

Appellants express pro-

found concern over the potential impact of Application No. 50723
on certain of their unidentified claims.

It is most difficult

to square this professed concern with Appellants' actions.

The

Utah Water Code provides interested parties with ample opportunity to protest any new application to appropriate water.

Notice

of all such applications must be advertised once a week for three
weeks in a local newspaper (§73-3-6).

There is a thirty-day pro-

test period following publication of the final notice {§73-3-7) .
Appellants chose not to protest Application No. 50723 and give
the State Engineer an opportunity to consider their objection,
but, rather, waited until a Decision had been made by the State
Engineer and then criticize that Decision for not considering
whatever objections Appellants may have had.

Thus, this is not

a situation where a water user who made his case before the State
Engineer and lost is seeking to have the State Engineer's Decision
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reviewed by the Court.

Rather, it is a situation where parties-

who claim to be seriously concerned about their potential claims
to water--have ignored the established administrative process
and, instead, seek recourse directly from the Court.

To allow

parties to ignore or bypass the administrative proceedings before
the State Engineer is completely at odds with the Utah Water Code,
which places the responsibility for water allocation with the
State Engineer (with his decisions being subject to court review).
Such a result would be inconsistent with the concept of a trial
de nova as contemplated under §§73-3-14 and -15 (Bullock v. Tracy,
4 Ut.2d 370, 294 P.2d 707 (1956)).

Appellants' actions fall woe-

fully short of supporting the claims and arguments which they are
advancing to this Court.
E.

Lack of Harm to Appellants
It is extremely difficult to understand Appellants' basic

concern at this stage of the proceedings before the State Engineer, and also their reluctance to let the administrative process be completed.

The State Engineer has held his Rehearing on

Application No. 50723, and---while he has not yet issued a decision--if he were to now reject this Application Appellants' Complaint would be moot.

Of course, the applicant might then seek

court review of the decision.

If, on the other hand, the State

Engineer affirms the approval of the subject Application, that
would then be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to
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the provisions of §73-3-14.

Thus, it is difficult to see where

Appellants are running any risk at all as a result of the Rehearing, or have any standing to complain about the Rehearing
of this matter in any event, since they have refused to participate in the administrative process.
F.

Appellants' Cases
The cases upon which Appellants rely do not support

their argument.

First, with respect to Smith v. Sanders, 112

Utah 517, 189 P.2d 701 (1948}, we have no quarrel with this
Court's conclusion that §73-3-14 provides the exclusive means
of seeking judicial review of a decision of the State Engineer.
However, the Court there was discussing a final decision of the
State Engineer after the sixty-day appeal period had elapsed.
There was no consideration or discussion of the matter of rehearing by the State Engineer within that sixty-day period.
In Laws v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 432, 211 P.2d
194 (1949), this Court ruled that the Industrial Commission could
not adopt a regulation dealing with denial of medical expenses
which was inconsistent with a statute allowing such expenses.
That is not the situation here.

There is no statutory prohibi-

tion against rehearings by the State Engineer.

McKnight v. State

Land Board, 14 Ut.2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963}, can be of little
comfort to Appellants.

There, the rules and regulations were

found to be consistent with the statutory authority of the Land
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Board.

This Court also pointed out in that case that ad.minis-

trative agencies have the power and authority necessary and
proper to accomplish their statutory objectives and duties (14
Ut.2d at 245).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IT LACKED SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE REHEARING ON APPLICATION NO. 50723, AND DISMISSED THE ACTION
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,

which governs the review of decisions of the State Engineer,
clearly contemplates a final decision of the State Engineer as
a jurisdictional prerequisite to any such appeal.
tion does not exist here.

That situa-

The effect of granting a rehearing

deprives the prior ruling of the finality required by §73-3-14.
The jurisdiction of the subject Application is still before the
State Engineer pending his decision on Rehearing.

Once a review

is made of the issues presented at the Rehearing, a final Memorandum Decision will be issued by the State Engineer which will
be appealable under the provisions of §73-3-14.

However, at

this point in time there is simply nothing for a court to assume
jurisdiction over for review, since the State Engineer's January
18th Memorandum Decision was withdrawn by the granting of a Rehearing.

Other water users have no legitimate complaint at this

point.
The pendency of a rehearing on a matter deprives a prior
decision of its finality, thus leaving no subject matter for a
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court to review:
As a general rule, when a rehearing is granted,
the status of the case is the same as though no
hearing had occurred.
3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error,
Section 810.
"At common law an order granting a
rehearing operates as a reversal of the original
decision."
4 C.J. 641; 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error,
§1446.
See also Hook v. Mercantile Trust Company,
7 Cir., 95 F. 41, 36 C.C.A. 645. Though the filing
of a petition for a rehearing does not vacate or
annul a judgment, it suspends the judgment from the
date of the filing of the petition. The granting
of a rehearing withdraws an opinion previously rendered and destroys its force and effect unless it
is subsequently adopted by the same tribunal.
3 Am.
Jur., Appeal and Error, Sections 809 and 811.
(Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Service Cornrn'n.,
54 S.E.2d 169 (W.Va. 1949)).
This Court, in the Laws case, supra, stated that:

"The

granting of a rehearing operates to vacate the award previously
rendered, and to require the case be tried anew."
198).

(211 P.2d at

Also, see Southland Industries v. Federal Communications

Comm'n., 99 F.2d 117 (D.C.Cir. 1938); State Dept. of Ecology v.
City of Kirkland, 523 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1974); and 2 Am.Jur.2d,
Administrative Law, §587, pp. 417-418.

Thus, it must follow

that since only final orders or decisions are reviewable by the
courts under statutes such as §73-3-14, there is no subject
matter jurisdiction for this action.
III.

THE STATE ENGINEER CLEARLY HAS AUTHORITY FOR HIS
ACTION ON APPLICATION TO APPROPRIATE NO. 50723
Appellants argue that, since the State Engineer did not

act upon certain applications to appropriate which Appellants
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have filed in his office, any action taken by him with respect
to Application No. 50723 is void ab initio because Application
No. 50723 may have been filed subsequent to other unapproved
applications in the same general area.
without merit.

This argument is totally

First of all, there is no evidence or data before

this Court demonstrating that the water source covered by Application No. 50723 is the same water source covered by the applications of those Appellants having unapproved applications pending before the State Engineer.

Further, Appellants are hardly

in any position to complain about the State Engineer's administrative review of Application No. 50723, since they refused to
participate in the administrative process, and are in fact trying
to totally circumvent it.
However, the more fundamental flaw in Appellants' argument
is that the statutory provision governing the approval and rejection of applications to appropriate specifically allows the
State Engineer to consider applications other than in the order
they are filed.

That statutory criteria is set forth in §73-3-8,

and this Court has squarely ruled that the State Engineer is not
bound to act upon applications to appropriate in their order of
filing (see Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943)).
Of course, Appellants' argument is really irrelevant at this
point, since the State Engineer has not yet issued his final
Decision on Application No. 50723.
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None of the statutes quoted in Point I of Appellants'
Brief support the arguments which Appellants assert.

For exaro-

ple, Appellants' reliance upon §73-3-1 is totally unwarranted.
That section of the Water Code is simply a legislative recog..
I,

nition and ratification of the appropriation doctrine which
does provide that among those users having established rights,
the user with the first priority shall receive his entire water
supply before a subsequent user shall be entitled to any water.
This section has absolutely nothing to do with unapproved applications, because such a user has no right to divert and use
water until his application is approved.

The State Engineer's

action on unapproved applications is governed solely by the
criteria set forth in §73-3-8.
Appellants' reliance on McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442,
201 P.2d 288 (1948} is likewise unfounded.

The language quoted

in Appellants' Brief was in the context of whether or not an unapproved application could be transferred or assigned prior to
approval by the State Engineer.
could.

The Court concluded that it

However, there is not one word in that decision remotely

suggesting that applications must be approved in the order in
which they are filed.

In fact, this Court, in McGarry, stated

that no vested right to the use of water is acquired by the mere
filing of an application (201 P.2d at 292}.

Accord, Whitmore v.

Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949} and Deseret Live Stock
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Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 Pac. 479 (1925).
IV.

APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT FAILS TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY
It is difficult to understand exactly what Appellants'

position is on this question, but in light of the lower court's
decision that it was without jurisdiction over this action,
there was no need to consider whether L. Derral Christensen
(who filed the subject Application) was an indispensable party
to this action, and the lower court did not address this question.

However, there can be no doubt but that the applicant

would be an indispensable party to any adjudication on the merits of said Application.

This applicant had the opportunity to

appear and defend his Application before the State Engineer, and
must be provided the same opportunity in any subsequent proceed1ngs involving his Application (Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Ut.
2d 196, 356 P.2d 631 (1960); also, see Hoyt v. Upper Marian
Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d 234 (1938)).
V.

CONCLUSION
This action was properly dismissed by the District Court

for lack of jurisdiction since there is no final decision on
Application No. 50723 as required by Section 73-3-14.
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